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Abstract
We study the following question: how does competition inuence the
inventory holdings of General Motorsdealership operating in isolated U.S.
markets? We wish to disentangle two mechanisms by which local competi-
tion inuences a dealers inventory: (1) the entry or exit of a competitor can
change a retailers demand (a sales e¤ect); (2) the entry or exit of a competi-
tor can change the amount of bu¤er stock a retailer holds, which inuences
the probability a consumer nds a desired product in stock (a service level
e¤ect). Theory is clear on the sales e¤ect - an increase in sales leads to an
increase in inventory (albeit a less than proportional increase). However,
theoretical models of inventory competition are ambiguous on the expected
sign of the service level e¤ect. Via a web crawler, we obtained data on in-
ventory and sales for more than 200 dealerships over a six month period.
Using cross-sectional variation, we estimated the e¤ect of the number and
type of local competitors on inventory holdings. We used several instrumen-
tal variables to control for the endogeneity of market entry decisions. Our
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results suggest that the service level e¤ect is strong, non-linear and positive.
Hence, we observe that dealers carry more inventory (controlling for sales)
when they face additional competition.
Keywords: Inventory competition, empirical, entry, supply chain manage-
ment, automobile industry.
1. Introduction
How does local competition inuence a retailers inventory holdings? Although an active theoretical
literature has recently emerged to explore this question, the question has so far received no direct
empirical investigation, which is the objective of this paper.
We focus on two mechanisms by which the degree of competition a retailer faces moderates
the retailers days-of-supply of inventory (i.e., the amount of inventory the retailer carries relative
to its sales). First, competition has a sales e¤ect - increased competition lowers a retailers
sales. Inventory theory (e.g., Zipkin (2000)) is clear on the direction of the sales e¤ect: lower sales
leads to a higher days-of-supply because of economies of scale in inventory management. Second,
competition has a service level e¤ect - increased competition inuences the retailers service level,
which, roughly speaking, is the probability the retailer has in stock an item when a customer
requests it. Here, theory is ambiguous. On the one hand, more competition leads to more intense
price competition and lower margins, which suggests a lower service level is optimal. On the
other hand, more competition gives consumers more choices for where and what to purchase, which
suggests a higher service level is optimal so as to better retain demand. Therefore, two questions
naturally emerge from this discussion: (1) can we empirically resolve the direction of the service-
level e¤ect and (2) how large is the service-level e¤ect relative to the sales e¤ect? If the service-level
e¤ect is positive (i.e., more competition leads to higher service levels) then these two e¤ects are
additive with respect to increased competition, which certainly leads to a higher days-of-supply. If
the service-level e¤ect is negative, then these two e¤ects moderate each other and the net impact
of competition on days-of-supply may be small (if their strengths are comparable).
We explore these issues in the context of the automobile industry. In particular, we collected
daily inventory and sales data over a six month period from General Motors (GM) dealerships
located in more than 200 markets within the United States. Our data, collected with a custom
built web-crawler, enables us to track individual vehicles (via each vehicles unique identication
number, or VIN) as they were added to or removed from a dealerships inventory because of a sale
to a consumer or a transfer between dealerships. We focus on isolated markets so that we can
clearly identify the number of competitors (i.e., dealerships) in the same market and the type of
competitors within the same market (i.e., the number of GM dealerships and the number of non-
GM dealerships), but we provide some evidence that the dealers in our sample are representative
of the entire population of GM dealers.
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Table 1 reports summary statistics from our data and illustrates the considerable heterogeneity
in inventory holdings across brands and across dealerships within a brand. Our empirical strategy
exploits this cross-sectional variation in the observed markets to identify the e¤ects of interest. We
use instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity of market entry decisions with respect to
unobserved market characteristics. (For example, some markets could have more GM dealerships
because GM is aware of certain market characteristics that make them favorable to GM dealerships
and those unobserved characteristics may also inuence inventory holdings in those markets.) We
focus on the auto industry because it is economically signicant and detailed data on local inventory
holdings are available (via our web-crawler). Although our results are specic to this industry, our
econometric methods could be applied to study inventory in other retail industries. Furthermore,
some of our ndings may apply broadly to other forms of retailing.
This research is related to the growing empirical literature on inventory. Wu et al. (2005) study
the relationship between rm inventory holdings and nancial performance, while Hendricks and
Singhal (2005) study the impact of supply chain disruptions (including problems with inventory)
on short term nancial and accounting measures. Gaur et al. (2005a) nd that as a retailers
margins decreases and capital intensity increases, it tends to carry less inventory relative to sales
(i.e., days of supply). Rumyantsev and Netessine (2007) use aggregate inventory data to measure
the relationship between demand uncertainty, lead times, gross margins and rm size on inventory
levels. Rajagopalan (2005) estimates the e¤ect of product variety on inventory levels of publicly
listed U.S. retailers. Amihud and Mendelson (1989) use public data on manufacturing rms to
estimate the e¤ect of market power (proxied by the rmsmargins and market shares) on inventory
levels and variability. They nd that rms lower their inventory as market power decreases, i.e.,
as competition intensies. Cachon and Olivares (2006) study inventory in the auto industry at
the brand level (e.g., Honda, Chevrolet) and report a positive association between the number of
dealerships and inventory, among other factors that inuence inventory. Note, all of these studies
use aggregated inventory at a brand, company or industry level and either have no measure of
competition or only an indirect measure of competition (e.g., observed margins or total number of
dealerships). In contrast, this work has data on individual units of inventory and direct measures
of the degree of competition in local markets.
In our work, a dealers inventory service level is one measure of the quality of the service the
dealer provides its customers - customers prefer higher service levels and a high service level is
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costly to the dealer. Therefore, our work is related to the considerable literature that empirically
investigates the relationship between competition and the level of quality provided in a market. For
example, Berry and Waldfogel (2003) compare two industries, local newspapers (where quality is
measured by the amount of content and the number of reporters) and restaurants (where quality
is measured through ratings). They nd that competition decreases quality in the newspaper
industry but increases quality with restaurants. Cohen and Mazzeo (2004) study retail banking,
where quality is measured in terms of the number of branches a bank operates. As with newspapers,
they nd that higher competition leads to lower quality. Others use product variety as a measure of
quality, such as Berry and Waldfogel (2001) with radio broadcasting, Alexander (1997) with music
recording, Ellickson (2007) with supermarkets and hair cutting establishments (i.e., barber shops
and salons), and Watson (2004) with eyeglass retailers. As in our paper, in each of those studies
there exists competing theories regarding the relationship between competition and quality.
Section 3 describes the data and the specication of the model. Section 4 shows our main
results and section 5 provides a sensitivity analysis and further empirical evidence. Section 6
measures the relative magnitude of the e¤ects we identify and discusses the implication for adding
and subtracting dealerships to local markets. We conclude and discuss our ndings in section 7.
2. An empirical model of retail inventory
In this section we use a basic inventory model to motivate a general empirical framework for the
relationship between retail inventory and competition. In the subsequent sections we apply this
framework to our analysis of inventory of vehicles at automobile dealerships.
Orders are received at the beginning of each period with zero lead-time. Let D be i.i.d. normal
demand in each period with mean  and standard deviation : Some fraction of the demand that
is not fullled from in-stock inventory is backordered; the remaining demand is lost. Each period
inventory is ordered so that there are Q units on-hand before demand occurs. In this model the
service level is the probability that all demand within a period is satised from inventory. The
service level is increasing in z = (Q   )=; so for convenience we refer to z as the service level
with the understanding that it is really a proxy for the service level. The expected inventory at
the end of each period, I, is then
I =  (z + L (z)) (1)
where L (z) is the standard normal loss function (see Zipkin (2000) for additional details).
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It is empirically inconvenient to work with (1) directly because demand is not observable.
However, (1) can be written as
I = sK (z) (2)
(see the appendix for details) where s is the standard deviation of sales (minfQ;Dg) and K (z)
is an increasing function. As in van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999), we use
s = A  Ss (3)
to approximate the standard deviation of sales, where S is observed sales over a sample period and
A and s are coe¢ cients. The s coe¢ cient reects the degree to which there are economies of
scale in inventory management with respect to sales.1 If s = 1; then days-of-supply (inventory
divided by daily demand rate) is independent of expected sales whereas if s < 1; then higher sales
retailers carry a lower days-of-supply for the same service level.2 Combining (2) and (3) and taking
logarithms yields:
log I = constant+s logS + logK (z) : (4)
The above equation suggests that a rms inventory level can be decomposed into two separate
components: a sales component, s logS; and a service level component, logK(z):
According to (4), competition can inuence a rms inventory through its sales or through its
service level or through both. The meaning of competitioncan depend on the particular retail
industry considered, but to provide concreteness to this discussion, we use the term competition
to refer to the number and type of retailers in a market. For example, in the context of our data
analysis, competitiondepends on the number of dealerships in a market and which dealerships
are in a market (e.g., GM vs non-GM). Given this interpretation, if a markets sales potential sales
is reasonably xed, then it is intuitive that entry (i.e., more competition) could reduce each rms
sales (the xed market potential is allocated among more rms). However, entry could increase
a retailers sales either because price competition is su¢ ciently severe to increase total sales (i.e.,
total potential demand increases) or via a retail agglomeration e¤ect - consumers may be more
likely to search a retailer located near other retailers rather than an isolated retailer because the
1This is a statisticalnotion of economies of scale because the coe¢ cient of variation is decreasing in sales (when
 < 1): Inventory theory also suggests the possibility of economies of scale due to batching, such as in the EOQ or
(R;Q) models. Inspection of our time series does not reveal a strong saw-toothpattern that one would expect in
the presence of batching.
2Gaur et al. (2005b) measures  using public data from the U.S. retail sector, obtaining estimates from 0.55 to
0.73.
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consumer wishes to economize on search costs.3 We are not directly concerned with the specic
mechanism by which competition inuences sales because we conjecture that these mechanisms
inuence inventory only through their e¤ect on sales.
A retailers service level choice depends on the retailers estimates of the cost of stocking too
much inventory (the overage costs) relative to the cost of stocking too little inventory (the underage
cost). The overage cost is composed of the opportunity cost of capital, storage costs and depre-
ciation. The underage cost depends on the behavior of consumers when they do not nd their
preferred product (which may depend, in part, on consumer characteristics like brand preferences,
income, etc.) In such a situation a consumer could purchase some other product at the retailer
(substitute), defer purchase of the most preferred product to a later time (backorder) or leave the
retailer without making a purchase (the no-purchase option). The retailers optimal service level
depends on the ratio of these costs: as the underage cost increases relative to the overage cost, the
retailers optimal service level increases.
With this understanding of how a retailer chooses a service level, we conjecture that there are
three mechanisms by which competition inuences the service level component of (4): a margin
mechanism, a demand-retention mechanism and a demand-attraction mechanism. The margin
mechanism is simply that additional competitors increases the intensity of price competition, which
lower margins, thereby decreasing the underage cost, i.e., a smaller margin reduces the consequence
of losing a customer due to a stock out, thereby lowering the incentive to hold inventory. The
demand-retention mechanism inuences underage costs via consumer behavior once the consumer
has chosen to shop at a retailer. As more competitors enter a market, consumers are more likely to
choose the no-purchaseoption relative to the substituteor backorderoption, thereby leading
to higher underage costs. Therefore, the margin and demand-retention mechanisms counteract
each other. The demand-attraction mechanism states that a higher service level may attract more
demand to a retailer (i.e., inuence their choice of where to shop), because, all else being equal, a
consumer prefers to shop at a retailer with a higher service level (See Dana and Petruzzi (2001) and
Gerchak and Wang (1994) for single-rm models in which service level is used to attract demand.)
According to the demand-attraction mechanism, more competition causes rms to increase their
service level to build their market share.
There is theoretical support for these three mechanisms that link competition to service level.
3See Dudey (1990), Eaton and Lipsey (1982), Stahl (1982) and Wolinsky (1983) for models of consumer search in
which rm location decisions are endogenous.
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Deneckere and Peck (1995) consider a model in which both the margin and demand-attraction
mechanisms are active but nd that they o¤set each other - service levels are independent of
the number of competitors. However, Dana (2001) modies their model and indeed nds that
entry can reduce service levels. The analogous conclusion can be inferred from Bernstein and
Federgruen (2005).4 Other models nd that competition induces rms to reduce their service level
even if a 100% service level is costless, because lower service levels dampen price competition (see
Balachander and Farquhar (1994) and Daugherty and Reinganum (1991)). Consistent with these
models, Gaur et al. (2005a) nd that retailers with lower margins carry lower inventory and Amihud
and Mendelson (1989) provide evidence of a direct link between market power and inventory levels.5
However, Cachon (2003) develops a specialized version of the Deneckere and Peck (1995) model
in which service levels are increasing in the number of competitors: rms use service level more
aggressively to attract demand when they face more competition.
The demand-retention e¤ect is absent in the Deneckere and Peck (1995) model (and its deriva-
tives) but it is included in Cachon et al. (2006) and Watson (2006). They show that rms increase
their service level as they face more competition because a higher service level reduces the chance
a consumer continues searching/shopping.
There are a number of papers that study inventory competition (e.g., Lippman and McCardle
(1997), Mahajan and van Ryzin (2001), Netessine and Rudi (2003)) but those models neither have
a demand-attractive e¤ect (the demand allocated to a retailer does not depend on his inventory)
nor a margin-e¤ect (price is assumed to be xed), nor a demand-retention e¤ect (rms do not
inuence whether consumers choose to purchase or continue shopping). As a result, competition
and service level are independent of each other in those models.
To summarize, theoretical models of inventory competition provide contradictory guidance with
respect to the relationship between service levels and competition. Additional competition reduces
service levels if the impact of price competition on margins is severe, whereas additional competition
increases service levels if higher service levels either attract additional demand or help to retain
demand.
We now further elaborate on (4). For each retailer r and product category b; we have shown
that inventory, Irb; is determined by a combination of sales, Srb; and the service level, zrb. (We
4 If prices decrease, Bernstein and Federgruen (2005) nd that service levels decrease, but they do not explicitly
study the impact of competition, and their model is ill suited to do so.
5Gaur et al. (2005a) do not directly link retail competition to inventory level - they only observe a correlation
between margins and inventory turnover.
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distinguish products by category because it is plausible that inventory levels across categories at the
same retailer have di¤erent motivations to hold inventory.) We use the index i to denote each (r; b)
observation and m (i) to denote the relevant market for observation i. Competition can inuence
sales and service level, but there are other factors describing a market that could inuence service
level (e.g., consumer characteristics). Let Wm(i) be a (column) vector of observable covariates
capturing the characteristics of the local market that a¤ect the service level of observation i.
(Throughout the paper, we use column vectors for covariates and row vectors for parameters.)
However, di¤erent observations from the same local market can have di¤erent service levels; that
is, there may be factors specic to a retailer or product category that a¤ect its service level. The
vector Vi captures observable factors of this kind. For example, Vi may include factors describing
the supply process of a retailer or a vector of brand dummies.
We assume the following reduced form for the service level component:
logK (zi) = vVi + Wm(i) + m(i) + i (5)
The error term m(i) captures unobserved factors relevant to the local market m (i) (i.e., to all
retailer/category pairs within market m(i)); i denotes other unobserved factors specic to obser-
vation i: The term Wm(i)+ m(i) is the e¤ect of local market conditions on service level. A subset
of the covariates in W; denoted by Cm(i); capture the intensity of competition in market m (i) : As
described later, in our data analysis Cm(i) includes the number of dealers in a market, the square
of the number of dealers and in some specications, the number of GM dealers. The term cCm(i)
measures the overall impact of competition within the market on service level, including price com-
petition and inventory competition e¤ects (e.g. demand attraction/retention e¤ects); therefore, its
sign is ambiguous. We refer to cCm(i) as the service level e¤ect. Other covariates in W include
an intercept and demographic characteristics of the markets that capture di¤erences in consumer
characteristics which inuence a retailers optimal service level.
Replacing (5) in (4) gives the following model, which can be estimated with data from a cross
section of retailers:
yi = Xi + Wm(i) + m(i) + i: (6)
where yi = log Ii, Xi = (logSi; Vi) and  = (s; v). The parameter vector to be estimated is
 = (; ) : We are interested in the magnitude of the coe¢ cient of sales s (s = 1 means there
are no economies of scale with respect to sales) and the sign and magnitude of the service level
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e¤ect (c < 0 suggests that the price e¤ect of competition dominates whereas c > 0 suggests that
the demand attraction/retention e¤ects dominate).
Estimation method
There are several challenges associated with the identication of : It is important to dene each
retailers market appropriately, otherwiseW may be a poor measure for local market characteristics.
This concern can be alleviated by identifying geographically isolated markets (a similar approach
was used by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991)). To estimate c precisely, it is important that the
selected markets have su¢ cient variation in the degree of competition.
The endogeneity of some of the variables in X and W is of particular concern with respect
to the identication of : Sales is a¤ected by product popularity, which may also a¤ect customer
purchase behavior (e.g., the propensity to backorder) and therefore the service level chosen by
retailers. While the demographic variables in W capture part of the heterogeneity in consumer
characteristics across markets, some customer characteristics are unobservable and will enter in
: If a market has consumers with a high a¢ nity to purchase the retailers products and these
consumer tastes are not fully captured by the covariates in W , then we would expect  to be
correlated with sales. Hence, estimating (6) with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) leads to biased
estimates of :
Measures of competition are subject to a similar endogeneity bias. Retailers choose which
markets to enter and they may do so based on market characteristics that they observe but are un-
observed by the econometrician. Inventory costs a¤ect dealership prots, therefore entry decisions
are a¤ected by local market characteristics that inuence inventory, including . If such is the case,
C and  may be correlated. Intuition suggests this correlation is negative: high service levels (high
) raise total inventory costs, leading to lower prots and fewer entrants (low C). This suggests a
downward bias in estimating cC through OLS.
We propose a two step method to estimate . In the rst step, use a within-market estimator
of  which accounts for the endogeneity of sales. In the second step, replace  in (6) with this
estimate and estimate the modied (6) using Instrumental Variables to account for the endogeneity
of competition (i.e., the number of retailers). We describe in detail this two step method in what
follows.
In the rst step, estimate  by comparing retailers located in the same local market. Dene
the set Mm = fi : m (i) = mg which contains all observations from market m. Also, let Xm =
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1
jMmj
P
i2Mm Xi and ym =
1
jMmj
P
i2Mm yi. Transform the dependent variable _yi = yi   ym(i) and
the covariates _Xi = Xi   Xm(i) to re-write (6) as
_yi =  _Xi + i (7)
Assuming E

_Xii

= 0; estimating (7) using OLS gives a consistent estimate of . The main
advantage of this model with respect to (6) is that it allows consistent estimation of  even when
some of the covariates in X (e.g. sales) are correlated with : Its main disadvantage is that the
e¤ect of local market conditions, Wm(i) + m(i), are not estimated.
The second step estimates  using the estimated coe¢ cient ^: Replace  in (6) with ^ and
rearrange to produce
yi   ^Xi = Wm(i) + "i; (8)
where "i = m(i) + i. We suggest estimating (8) using Instrumental Variables (IV) to instrument
for the endogeneity of competition. We seek factors excluded from Wm(i) that are correlated with
competition but uncorrelated with unobservable consumer characteristics that enter in m(i): In
our subsequent data analysis, we use measures of market population as our main instruments on
the assumption that population is correlated with entry (more rms enter as a markets population
increases) and population is uncorrelated with unobserved consumer characteristics that inuence
service level conditional on the observed controls in Wm(i):6 The exogenous instruments, denoted
by Z, include several measures of population and the demographics in W . Z does not include
covariates in X or the measures of competition, C: Assuming E (Zi"i) = 0, estimating (8) using
Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) gives a consistent estimator of :
Our two-step method estimates  consistently based on two moment conditions: E( _Xii) = 0
and E (Zi"i) = 0: Instead of using a two-step method, it is possible to estimate these moment
conditions jointly using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). (See the appendix for details.)
There are two main advantages of the GMM approach. First, it is more e¢ cient (the estimation
is more precise). (See Wooldridge (2002), Section 8.3 for details on the statistical properties of
GMM.) Second, the standard errors provided by the 2SLS in the second step of the two-step
method are not correct because the regression includes variables which are estimated (^Xi). The
standard errors from the joint estimation using GMM are correct (and therefore can be used to
validate hypothesis testing). The main drawback from using GMM is that  is biased when the
6The assumption that larger markets lead to more entry can be veried empirically when markets are well dened.
See Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) for empirical evidence of the e¤ect of population on entry in auto dealership markets.
9
second moment condition E (Zi"i) = 0 is misspecied (i.e., when some of the covariates in Z are
not exogenous). In addition, common statistics used to evaluate the goodness of t in regressions
(e.g. R2) are not available for GMM.
3. Data and Model Specication
This section begins with a brief description of the U.S. auto industry and then details the data in
our study. During the period of our study, six companies accounted for about 90% of sales in the
U.S. auto market: Chrysler, Ford, GM, Honda, Nissan and Toyota.7 We refer to Chrysler, Ford and
GM as domestic manufacturers. Each company o¤ers vehicles under several brands. For example,
GM brands include Chevrolet, GMC, Pontiac, Buick, Saturn, Cadillac and Hummer. Each brand
produces several models. Examples include the Chevrolet Malibu, the Toyota Camry and the Ford
Explorer. Models can be classied into vehicle classes, including cars, sports cars, Sport Utility
Vehicles (SUV) and pickups, among others.
In the U.S., auto distribution is regulated by franchise laws, which require that all new vehicles
must be sold through a network of dedicated franchised dealers. (See Smith (1982) for details on
dealership franchise laws.) In 2006 there were approximately 22,000 dealerships in the U.S. The
number of dealerships has been declining in the U.S. since it peak in 1930 when there were about
50,000 dealerships (Marx (1985)). Furthermore, dealerships are not uniformly distributed across
the U.S.. In states with large population growth from 1950 - 2004, such as Arizona, there is
approximately the same number of GM and Japanese brand dealerships, whereas in slow growth
states, such as Iowa, GM dealerships are much more numerous in a relative sense.
3.1 Primary data
Based on (6), we seek to dene isolated markets so that we can accurately proxy for the level of
competition within the market. We begin with Urban Areas (UA) dened in the 2000 Census
and with population below 150,000.8. We designate an UA as isolated if it meets the criteria
summarized in Table 2. These criteria impose minimum distance requirements to markets of equal
or larger size with the rationale that consumers who do not nd their desired product inside their
7Chrysler was owned by Daimler-Chrysler but we refer to this manufacturer as Chrysler. In May 2007 (after
our data collection period) it changed ownership to a private equity rm, Cerberus Capital Management.
8These include: (i) urbanized areas consisting of territory with a general population density of at least 1,000
people per square mile of land area that together have a minimum residential population of at least 50,000 people;
and (ii) urban clusters of densely settled territory with at least 2,500 people but fewer than 50,000. (quoted from
Census glossary, www.census.gov)
10
market will try to nd that product in the closest more populous market. Dranove et al. (1992)
and Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) use similar criteria to dene isolated markets. From this set of
markets, we selected for our study the 235 markets that have at least one GM dealership. (As we
describe later, our data are from GM dealerships.) We obtained demographic data and geo-coded
information (latitude and longitude) for these markets from the 2000 decennial census. 37%, 5%,
26% and 31% of the markets are located in the Mid-West, North-East, South and West census
regions, respectively. Figure 1 provides a map indicating their locations.
Data on new vehicle dealerships located in each market were obtained from edmunds.com.9 The
denition of an automobile dealership is somewhat ambiguous. For example, a dealer may operate
brands of di¤erent manufacturers, but generally the vehicles of di¤erent manufacturers are shown
in separated showrooms. Sometimes the showrooms are listed with di¤erent addresses or telephone
numbers. We dened a dealership as a geographic locationa US Postal Service standard address
that carries vehicles of one manufacturer. If a location happens to indicate brands from two or
more manufacturers, we count them as multiple dealerships (one for each manufacturer). With this
denition, it is possible to have markets with multiple dealerships which are jointly owned. We
classify these as distinct dealers because the inventory in these showrooms are probably managed
separately and this leads to a conservative measure of competition if they are managed jointly. For
robustness, in Section 5 we report results with alternative criteria to dene dealerships.
Table 3 describes the selected markets, grouped according to the total number of Ford, Chrysler,
GM, Honda, Toyota and Nissan dealerships. The second column shows the number of markets with
the observed number of dealers. For example, there are 10 markets with one GM dealership. In
more than 90% of the markets there are 10 or fewer dealerships. The number of dealerships increases
with market size, measured by population (third column). The last three columns show the percent
of markets with at least one dealership of a non-GM domestic manufacturer (Ford or Chrysler),
Japanese manufacturer (Toyota, Honda or Nissan) and a second GM dealership, respectively. The
rst two competitors faced by a GM dealer are usually non-GM domestic dealerships. Japanese
dealerships usually exist in markets with three or more dealerships. In almost all markets with two
or more GM dealers, the GM dealers carry di¤erent brands10. The table shows that the selected
markets have su¢ ciently rich variation in competition, both in the number and type of dealerships.
9We matched dealers to UA based on 5 digit zipcodes. Matching tables were obtained from the Missouri Census
Data Center (http://mcdc2.missouri.edu).
10Only 4 markets have GM dealerships with overlapping GM brands.
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We obtained inventory and sales data from a website o¤ered by GM (http://www.gmbuypower.com)
that enables customers to search new vehicle inventory at local dealerships. We developed a web-
crawler that each day monitored inventory in all the GM dealerships located in our selected markets
(and only GM dealerships11) from August 15, 2006 to February 15, 2007 (six months of data). The
web-crawler recorded the number and type of vehicles available at each dealership (e.g., the number
of GMC Yukon 2007 4WD available at each dealer) along with specic information on each vehicle,
such as color, options, list price and, most importantly, the vehicle identication number (VIN).
VINs uniquely identify all new vehicles in the U.S. Therefore, by keeping track of the VINs available
at each dealership, we are able to identify replenishments (a vehicle is added to a dealers inventory)
and sales (a vehicle is removed from a dealers inventory). We also can identify dealer transfers (a
vehicle removed from one dealers inventory and added to another dealers inventory) among the
dealers in our sample. However, to identify all dealer transfers would require monitoring all dealers
in the U.S., which was not feasible. Instead, we monitored all dealerships in seven states, which we
believe allows us to identify most of the transfers occurring in our sample markets in those states.
The sensitivity analysis on section 5 shows that the results are similar when restricting the sample
to dealerships in these 7 states.12
To validate our data, we visited three dealerships in the Philadelphia area. Most of the vehicles
found at these dealers on June 2, 2006 were posted on the website during that day. The dealerships
visited declined to provide data on the specic vehicles sold.13
We obtained the following demographic data for each market: percent of population above 60
years old (ELDER), that is African-American (BLACK ), with a college degree (COLLEGE ), active
in the army (ARMY ), involved in a farming occupation (FARMING) and that commutes to work
with public transportation (PUBTRANS ). We also obtained median household income for each
UA (INCOME ).
We included BLACK, INCOME, COLLEGE, ELDER, and FARMING inW because these vari-
ables have substantial partial correlation with the number of dealerships in a market. In addition,
we included PUBTRANS and ARMY (to capture potential di¤erences in consumer characteris-
11Developing web-crawlers for each manufacturer would require substantial additional e¤ort. We monitored our
web-crawler frequently in case changes were made to the website. In fact, during our study period GM did change
its website. Substantial e¤ort was required to repair the crawler.
12The selected states are Colorado, Nebraska, Florida, Wisconsin, Maine, California and Texas. These states are
geographically relatively isolated (they border Mexico or Canada, they have a substantial coastline and/or their
border areas are sparsely populated) and exhibit variation in population growth.
13We selected this dealerships by convenience. None of the selected markets are in the Philadelphia area. The
dealership lots include many vehicles (sometimes more than 100) and the authors could not verify all of them.
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tics and their a¢ nity for domestic brands) and indicators of the census region where the UA is
located.14
3.2 Model specication
To estimate model (6), we dened the dependent variable as the average vehicle inventory of each
brand at a GM dealership (INV ), i.e., the dependent variable is inventory at a dealer-brand pair.
(HUMMER is excluded from our analysis because it is present in only one of our study markets.)
We evaluated total sales (SALES ) of each brand at each dealership during the study period to
measure expected sales. (Sales includes vehicles transferred to other dealerships.)
Several di¤erent measures of competition are included in C. The simplest measure is the
number of dealerships in the market (ND). We restricted the dealership counts to the following
manufacturers: GM, Chrysler, Ford, Toyota, Honda and Nissan. We included the square of this
variable (NDSQ) to capture non-linearities in the e¤ect of competition. We also estimated the
e¤ect of the number of rivals using a exible non-parametric specication, with indicator variables
of the form x = 1 fND = xg ; with x 2 f1::Nmaxg : We restricted our sample to markets with 8
or fewer dealerships to measure this e¤ect more precisely (Nmax = 8).15 In some specications,
we also include the number of GM dealerships in the market (NGM ) to test whether the e¤ect of
competition varies across di¤erent types of dealerships.
To measure potential competition from outside the market, we included a covariate in W that
measures the driving time, in hours, to the closest GM dealership outside the UA (OUTSIDE )
We used driving time to capture the e¤ect of nearby highways on transportation costs16. We also
estimated models with bird-ydistance and to GM dealerships carrying the same brand. Our
results were similar with these alternative measures.
GM dealerships can own multiple GM brands. If customers substitute between di¤erent GM
brands, a stock-out in one brands is less likely to become a lost sale for a multi-brand dealership,
because customers may buy a vehicle from another brand on the lot. If substitution within GM
14Previous work estimating demand for automobiles have used similar measures to capture age, income, occupation
and race (e.g. Berry et al. (2004), Agarwal and Ratchford (1980)). Marketing research rms focused in the auto
industry collect similar data (e.g. R.L. Polk, http://usa.polk.com). We also estimated specications which included
additional demographics, including voter turnout, the percent of Republican votes, the percent Latino in the popula-
tion, and the average number of vehicles per household, among others. The results in these specications were similar
to those reported in Section 4. Some of these additional variables were not available for all markets, so we decided
to exclude them from our main results. Some of the demographics included in our main results are not statistically
signicant, but excluding them from the analysis does not change our main results.
15We also expanded our sample including markets with 9 and 10 dealerships and our results were similar.
16The data was retrieved from http://www.randmcnally.com.
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brands is substantial, we expect the number of GM brands carried by a dealership (NBRAND) to
have a negative e¤ect on the service level. This dealer specic measure is included as a covariate
in X: Brand dummies were also included in X to control for di¤erences in customer loyalty and
preferences that can inuence service level.
The service level may also be a¤ected by a dealerships supply process. For example, trans-
fers between dealerships enable dealerships to share inventory, which helps to reduce inventory.17
Therefore, we include a measure of transfers as a control variable in X. Let Trb be the total amount
of transfers received by dealership r of brand b and let Qrb be the total incoming orders (without
transfers from other dealerships) received. For observation i = (r; b), we measure the percent of
transfers received as: TRANSF i = Ti=(Ti +Qi): We expect TRANSF to have a negative e¤ect on
average inventory levels. Recall, we are unlikely to observe all of the transfers for all dealerships.
We include a dummy, ALLSTATE, to indicate whether the dealership is located in one of the states
where we monitored all dealerships.18
We found some outliers in our sample. Two dealerships located in Alaska were extremely
isolated (the driving time to the closest GM dealership, OUTSIDE, was more than 6 hours). These
two dealerships (3 observations in total) were removed from the sample.19 The nal sample contains
654 observations in 178 markets. Table 4 shows summary statistics and the correlation matrix of
the main variables in the econometric model.
3.3 Instrumental variables
We use total population in the UA (UAPOP), fringe population (FRINGEPOP) and population
density (DENS ) to instrument for competition. The fringe population of a UA is dened as the
population of all zipcodes outside the UA within a 100 miles radius for which the UA is the
closest UA with dealerships20. We also used measures of past population as instruments: county
17Anupindi and Bassok (1992) show that centralization of inventory stocks of multiple retailers usually decreases
total inventory relative to the decentralized case where each retailer chooses their inventory level independently. Rudi
et al. (2001) analyze a model of two newsvendors with transshipments of left-over inventory. It can be shown that
their model implies a negative association between the average number of transfers received by a retailer and its
service level. Narus and Anderson (1996) report inventory reductions from inventory sharing initiatives in several
industries operating with decentralized distribution networks.
18 If the coe¢ cient on TRANSF is negative, we expect ALLSTATE to be positive because for the observations
with ALLSTATE=0 a fraction of the transfers are unobserved. In all the specications analyzed, the coe¢ cient on
ALLSTATE was positive and signicant. The average percent of transfers for dealerships with ALLSTATE=0 and
ALLSTATE=1 is 4.5% and 10%, respectively. ALLSTATE is market specic and is therefore included in W:
19 Including them in the sample changes the coe¢ cient of OUTSIDE, but the other estimates are similar.
20A similar measure was used by Dranove et al. (1992). We calculated distances using latitude and longitude. The
census proxy of zipcodes (Zip Code Tabulation Area, ZCTA) were used.
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population and density in 1950 and 1970 (POP50, POP70, DENS50, DENS70 ). Franchising laws
impose costs on the manufacturer to close existing dealerships. Markets with current low population
which had higher population in the past are likely to have more dealerships than those which
never had a large population. Due to this stickiness in dealership exit, past population has
positive partial correlation (conditional on current population) with the number of dealerships.
All population measures were included with natural log transformation because it provided better
t in the rst stage estimates of the 2SLS regressions. As mentioned earlier, population growth
rate is associated with higher entry of dealerships, so we dened two additional instruments that
depend on county population growth between 1950 and 2000 (denoted g): PGWTH=max (0; g) and
NGWTH=max (0; g) :21 UA population was obtained from the 2000 decennial census. Historical
county population was obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Sciences (ICPSR).
4. Results
In this section, we discuss the results reported in Table 5 which displays the estimation results.
Column (1) shows the estimates of the rst step of our two step method. Columns (2)-(4) show
di¤erent specications for the second step of the method. Column (5) shows the joint GMM
estimates. The coe¢ cients for the demographics and the dummies for brand, region and ALLSTATE
are omitted for ease of visualization.
Column (1) shows that the point estimates of the coe¢ cient of logSALES (s) is measured
with precision and is below one with statistical signicance. The magnitude of the  coe¢ cient
suggest substantial economies of scale: a 10% increase in sales translates into only a 6.3% increase in
inventory. The use of transfers from other dealerships, measured by TRANSF, has a large economic
(and statistically signicant) e¤ect in reducing inventory levels. Increasing TRANSF by 0.1 (a 10%
increase in the fraction of supply received from transfers) reduces inventory by approximately 8%.
The coe¢ cient on NBRAND is small and not signicant. The coe¢ cient of determination (R2)
is high, suggesting that a substantial fraction of the within-market variation on inventory can be
explained by the covariates included in X.
Column (2) shows the estimates of the service level e¤ect of competition (c) using OLS. The
specication includes a linear and a quadratic term of the number of dealerships in the market
21Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) uses similar functions of population growth to capture entry in auto dealership
markets.
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(ND and NDSQ). The estimates suggest that the e¤ect of competition is positive and marginally
decreasing. Figure 2 illustrates the estimated impact of the number of dealerships on inventory,
measured by the percent change relative to a monopolist. The gure shows the e¤ect of competition
through service level only (sales is kept constant). Upper and lower bounds of the 95% condence
interval are illustrated with + and - symbols, respectively (standard errors are calculated using the
delta method, see Hayashi (2000)). The squares in the gure plot the estimates from a exible
specication using indicator variables for each level of competition (the x variables). Interestingly,
the more parsimonious quadratic polynomial model provides a good approximation of the exible
model. In all the specications analyzed, the coe¢ cient of OUTSIDE is negative, suggesting that
inventory tends to increase with the proximity of GM dealerships outside the market. This e¤ect
is consistent with the positive coe¢ cient on ND, but the economic signicance of OUTSIDE is
smaller: reducing OUTSIDE one standard deviation at the mean increases inventory by 3.5%,
while increasing ND by one standard deviation at the mean increases inventory by 12.5%.
Column (3) estimates equation (8) using IVs to instrument for the endogenous variables ND
and NDSQ. IVs include UAPOP, FRINGEPOP, PGWTH, NGWTH, DENS and past population
and density variables. Even though the estimates are less precise than in (2), they suggest a similar
pattern for the service level e¤ect. ND and NDSQ are jointly signicant (the p-value of the F-test
is less than 0.001) and both ND and NDSQ coe¢ cients are signicantly di¤erent from zero at the
10% condence level. In fact, the service level e¤ect suggested by the IV estimates is slightly larger
than the OLS estimate: a one standard deviation increase of ND at the mean increases inventory
by 16.5%. However, we cannot reject that the coe¢ cients of ND and NDSQ of specications (2)
and (3) are di¤erent with statistical signicance (p-value>8%). The R2 of the rst stage regression
of the 2SLS (with ND as the dependent variable) is 0.68.22
Columns (4) includes the number of GM dealerships (NGM ) as an additional measure of com-
petition. The estimates suggest that the e¤ect of entry of a rival GM dealership has a larger positive
e¤ect compared to the e¤ect of an average dealer.
Column (5) reports the joint GMM estimates. The instruments used in these estimations include
exogenous variables in W and the IVs use in specication (3). Hence, the estimates of column (5)
are comparable to those of (3). The point estimates of the estimated coe¢ cients obtained through
GMM (column (5)) and the two step method (column (3)) are similar in magnitude but the GMM
22The rst stage estimates can obtained from the authors upon request.
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estimation is more precise. The ND and NDSQ coe¢ cients are signicant at the 1% condence
level, respectively. Because the asymptotic standard errors of the GMM estimates are correct, this
validates the statistical signicance of our results.23
Both the OLS and IV estimates suggest a positive and marginally decreasing e¤ect of competi-
tion on service level. While the point estimates of OLS and IV are di¤erent, the elasticities at the
mean are similar in magnitude. The statistical evidence cannot reject that the OLS estimates are
unbiased. Given the higher precision of the OLS estimates, we focus the discussion on the results
of specications (2) and (4).
Our result contrast somewhat with the ndings in Gaur et al. (2005a) and Amihud and Mendel-
son (1989). Gaur et al. (2005a) nds that as a retailer lowers its margin, it tends to carry less
inventory. (Amihud and Mendelson (1989) has a similar nding but they study manufacturing
rms.) If low margins are taken as a proxy for more intense competition, then they nd that
inventory decreases with competition. They do not study auto retailing, so it is possible that in
other retail markets the margin e¤ect of entry dominates the demand attraction/retention e¤ects.
Alternatively, margins in their data may proxy for something other than competition. (They con-
trol for deviations from sales forecast but not for sales volume, so it is possible that in their analysis
gross margin also proxies for sales volume.) Further research is needed to reconcile these issues and
ndings.
5. Sensitivity analysis and further empirical evidence
In this section, we discuss the representativeness of our sample, report on a sensitivity analysis and
provide additional empirical evidence to test the robustness of our results.
Our results provide direct evidence of the reaction of a sample of GM dealerships to competition
within the U.S. Without additional data, it is not possible to convincingly claim whether or
not dealers from other automobile manufacturers react in a similar manner. Furthermore, while
it is possible that retailers in other industries increase their inventory holdings when faced with
additional competition, additional data collection and analysis is needed to evaluate this conjecture.
Given that we analyzed isolated markets, there is a question as to whether our results apply to
all GM dealerships. To explore this issue, recall that we collected inventory and sales data from
all dealer-brand pairs in seven states, the ALLSTATE dealerships. Using that data set, we regress
23We also estimated specications (2) and (4) through GMM and the estimates were also similar.
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days-of-supply at dealer-brand pairs on a dummy variable indicator of whether the dealer-brand
is in our isolated market set, INIM; and controls for state and brand. In a second regression we
include the log of the population of the dealer-brands market, logPOP. As reported in Table 6, on
average, dealers in our selected markets carry about 8% less inventory relative to dealers located in
the same state and same brand, but if we control for population, the coe¢ cient on INIM decreases
and becomes statistically insignicant, which suggests that they are not di¤erent than GM dealers
outside our sample in terms of their inventory holdings.
As an additional check, we compared our estimates of days-of-supply in our ALLSTATE states
to days-of-supply data from Wards Auto for the same period and report the results in Table 7. We
nd that our days-of-supply match Wards closely for both Cadillac and Saturn. For the other
GM brands our days-of-supply is higher than Wards but they include eet sales (e.g., government
agencies, car rental companies) in their calculation of sales whereas we do not (we presume that
eet sales are not recorded in dealersinventories and instead ow directly to the customer). We
evaluated the amount of eet sales that would be required for our data to match Wards. Fleet
sales of about 20-25% is plausible for those brands. The results from Table 7 provide some evidence
that our sample reasonably matches the publicly reported data by Wards.24
In our main results, we control for systematic di¤erences in inventory levels across GM brands
(through the brand dummies), but the coe¢ cients on competition are restricted to be equal across
brands. Hence, our estimates show the average e¤ect of competition on inventory, and it would be
of interest to determine whether this e¤ect varies across brands. Restricting the sample to specic
brands reduces the sample size signicantly, reducing the precision of the estimates. But we were
able to repeat our analysis in a sub-sample that contained only Chevrolet dealerships, which were
present in 170 of the 178 markets. The results over this sub-sample were qualitatively similar to
those reported in Table 5: the estimates also suggest a positive and marginally decreasing e¤ect of
competition on service level. Increasing the number of dealerships by one (at the mean) increases
inventory by approximately 9% (in our main results, this elasticity is 8%).25
We conducted several regression diagnostics. We found no major inuential points in the sample.
24Wards includes all states, whereas we include only seven states, so that could explain some of the di¤erences as
well. Furthermore, we report days-of-supply as the average of ratios across dealers, whereas Wardsreports the ratio
of averages. Our analysis (details available from the authors) indicates that this could explain some of the di¤erences
but eet sales seems more likely to be the main explanatory factor.
25Recall, the estimation of  uses variation across dealerships in the same market. Therefore, we continue to use
dealerships from all brands to do the rst step estimation. In the second step, the sub-sample of Chevrolet dealership
is used to estimate .
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The variance ination factors are all below four, suggesting that multi-collinearity is not a major
issue. A Breusch-Pagan test suggest heteroscedasticity of the error term i, so we report robust
standard errors for the rst step regression (for the second step regression the p-value of the test is
0.28, suggesting homoscedasticity of the error term "i).
Model (6) suggests a linear relationship between the logarithms of inventory and sales, and
requires a constant s across markets with di¤erent market structures. A scatter plot of logINV
versus logSALES reveals a strong linear relationship between the two variables in three types of
markets: markets with a single GM dealership, markets with GM and non-GM domestic dealers,
and markets with all kinds of dealerships (GM, non-GM domestic and Japanese). A regression of
logINV on logSALES allowing for di¤erent slopes and intercepts across the three groups yields
R2 = 0:95 and fails to reject the hypothesis of equal slopes across the three series (p = 0:36).26
This analysis suggests there are no interaction e¤ects between logSALES and competition, i.e.,
the e¤ect of competition on service level is separable from the e¤ect of sales.
Regressions over the sub-sample of dealerships with ALLSTATE = 1 yield estimates that are
similar in magnitude, sign and statistical signicance to those reported in Table 5.
Model (6) can be subject to non-classical measurement error bias if average inventory and sales
are estimated from a short interval of time. To explain, suppose only one week of daily observations
are available to evaluate INV (average inventory level) and SALES (a dealers expected sales). If
sales during that week were below average, then INV overestimates average inventory and SALES
underestimates expected sales. The measurement errors of INV and SALES are then negatively
correlated, and so the coe¢ cient on sales, s, is likely to be downward biased. We replicated our
analysis using three months of data and the results were basically identical to our main results
(data from a six month period), which suggests that this potential measurement error bias is small
in our analysis.
We estimated the econometric model using alternative dealership denitions. We dened a
measure based on ownership: if two or more dealerships located in the same market are jointly
owned, they are counted as a single dealership. Because we do not have data on ownership, we
used the following criteria to assess whether dealerships are jointly owned: (1) they are listed with
the same US Postal Service address; or (2) they have the same telephone; or (3) they have similar
names.27 With this alternative denition, the mean number of dealerships per market is 3.4 (the
26 In pairwise tests of the coe¢ cients the smallest p value was 0.18.
27To match names, all words in the dealer names have to match. To be conservative in the matching, we do not
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standard deviation is 1.7). We estimated the model replacing ND with this new measure. The
coe¢ cients of ND and NDSQ are .21 and -0.018, respectively, both statistically signicant (p-
value<.01). These results also suggest a positive and marginally decreasing e¤ect of competition
on service level. Increasing competition by one standard deviation at the mean increases inventory
in approximately 10%, similar to what we obtained with our previous dealership denition.
We also estimated the model using the number of brands o¤ered in the market as the measure of
competition. For example, if a Chrysler dealership sells vehicles from Dodge and Jeep (two brands
of this manufacturer), we counted them as two competitors. As before, the e¤ect of this competition
measure is positive and statistically signicant. Increasing ND by one standard deviation at the
mean raises inventory approximately 5%.28
Further evidence of the e¤ect of competition on service level
To estimate equation (6), we use market population as an IV to identify a causal e¤ect of
competition on service level (section 4). The main concern with OLS is that the positive correla-
tion between competition and service level could be driven by unobserved factors that a¤ect both
variables rather than a causal e¤ect of competition. For example, non-GM dealerships may have a
stronger incentive to enter markets where customer loyalty to GM brands is lower. The number of
dealerships in a market becomes a proxy of consumers lack of loyalty for GM, which could have a
positive association with the service level chosen by GM dealers.29 Given the demographic controls
included in W , we believe it is unlikely that unobserved consumer characteristics that a¤ect service
level are correlated with market population. Hence, the IV estimates should be consistent. Never-
theless, we provide additional results following a di¤erent identication strategy which corroborate
our ndings.
In equation (6) we use the number of dealerships in a market as a measure of competition. We
argue, due to the demand attraction and retention e¤ects, that dealerships raise their service level
when they face more intense competition to prevent losing customers to rival stores. If so, then the
allow matching based only on commonly repeated words, such as town or make names. For example, two dealers
located in Swainsboro, GA with names "Swainsboro Chevrolet" and "Swainsboro Toyota" are not considered to be
jointly owned.
28Since we do not observe the inventory of dealers other than GM, we do not know which brands are sold at non-GM
dealerships. Edmunds.com provides information on the brands o¤ered by dealers, which we used to construct the
measure of competition based on brands.
29For example, suppose there exists some consumer characteristic describing loyalty for GM brands which is ob-
served by rms and unobserved by the econometrician. This characteristic must be particular to a subset of markets
because we control (via brand dummies) for the overall preference for GM brands. Based on this characteristic, Ford
dealers are attracted to markets where loyalty for GM is low. GM dealerships raise their service level in these markets
because of the presence of this characteristic, not per se because of the presence of the Ford dealership.
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e¤ect of entry on service level should depend not only on the number of dealerships in a market
but also on the number and type of products they o¤er. An entrant that o¤ers more models which
are close substitutes to the products o¤ered by the incumbents should trigger a larger increase in
the service level. In fact, Cachon and Olivares (2006) show that the aggregate inventory of a model
tends to increase with the number of models o¤ered in the same segment.
To validate our conjecture, we estimate equation (6) using the number of models o¤ered by rival
dealerships as a measure of competition. Following the literature of spatial competition (e.g. Seim
(2006)), we dene di¤erent bands where the products o¤ered by rival dealerships can be located.
These bands dene a measure of distancebetween product b and products o¤ered by rivals. The
denition of the bands is based on a market segmentation commonly used in the auto industry.
While these denitions can be subjective, we feel they work reasonably well to capture the degree
of similarity across products in this industry. We conjecture that the number of products in closer
bands should have a higher impact on the service level than products located in the outer bands. On
the contrary, if the association between service level and market structure is driven by unobserved
customer loyalty for GM, then products in all bands should have a similar positive association,
because customer loyalty for GM would a¤ect entry in all bands evenly. Therefore, this model
is useful to determine whether unobserved factors related to customer loyalty for GM could be
confounding the competition e¤ect estimated in Table 5.
Let 
 be the set of all models o¤ered in model-year 2007. For a given product b, we dene a
partition


1b :::

K
b
	
of the set of products 
 and refer to 
kb as the k
th band of product b. Bands
are dened so that their distance to product b is increasing in k: Let Ckrb be the number of models
in band 
kb o¤ered by the rivals of dealership r: The number of models o¤ered is calculated based
on the brands carried by each rival dealership and the list of models o¤ered by each brand30. We
included dealerships of all manufacturers (not just the six included in the previous estimation).
Dene the column vector Crb =
 
C1rb:::C
K
rb
0
and the row vector of parameters  =
 
 1::: K

: The
parameter  k measures the average e¤ect of adding a model in the kth band to the assortment of
a rival dealership in the market.
We estimate the following linear model (6):
yrb = Xrb +  Crb + dW
d
m(r) + rb (9)
30We do not know the actual number of models o¤ered since we do not observe inventory of dealerships other than
GM.
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were yrb, Xrb are dened as before and W dm(r) includes demographics (it does not include measures
of competition). This model is di¤erent from (6) because the service level e¤ect, which in (9)
is captured by  Crb, depends not only on the number of dealerships in the market but also the
number and type of models they o¤er. Two GM dealers located in the same local market carrying
di¤erent assortments (e.g. a GMC dealers and a Chevrolet dealer) therefore face di¤erent levels
of competition. We dene product bands based on Wards model segmentation, which classies
models into 26 segments based on three dimensions: vehicle class (e.g. standard car, luxury car,
sport utility vehicle), size and price.
For our analysis, we focus on groups of products for which at least three product bands can be
reasonably dened. We chose small and medium sized standard cars (hereon SM cars, which exclude
luxury and large cars) and light-trucks (hereon Trucks, which include SUV, CUV and mini-van)31.
We dened bands for the segments in each of these two groups and ran two separate regressions.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average inventory level of models in a specic model
segment o¤ered by each dealership. For example, for the SM car regression, inventory of "Lower
Small Car" and "Upper Middle Car" of a specic dealership is counted as two di¤erent observations.
For SM cars, four bands were dened. The rst band includes standard cars which have similar
size or price (B(PRICE,SIZE)). The second band includes all other standard cars (B(STDCAR)).
The third and fourth band includes luxury cars and light-trucks, respectively (B(ANYCAR) and
B(OTHER))32. For Trucks, we dened three bands. The rst band includes vehicles within the
same class with similar size or price (B(PRICE,SIZE)). For example, if b ="Middle SUV", band 1
includes vehicles in the segments "Middle Luxury SUV" and "Large SUV" but not "Large Luxury
SUV" or "Middle CUV". Band 2 includes all other trucks (B(TRUCK)), and band 3 all cars
(B(OTHER)).
Table 8 summarizes the OLS estimation results of model (9) for SM cars and Trucks. The
results show that the number of vehicles in the rst band has a positive e¤ect on the service level,
and the marginal e¤ect is decreasing in the number of vehicles. The number of vehicles in the outer
bands have no signicant e¤ect on the service level (conditional on the number of models in the rst
band). The results are similar in sign and magnitude across the SM cars and Truck regressions,
but the statistical signicance of the Truck results is smaller.
31Full-sized vans and pickups are excluded because we could not obtain inventory data on them. We excluded large
and luxury cars because bands for these types of vehicles could not be reasonably dened.
32A regression that merges the 3rd and 4th brand obtains similar results.
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To compare the magnitude of the service level e¤ect between this product competition model
and our initial number-of-dealershipscompetition model (equation (6)), we estimate the implied
elasticities of each model. For the SM car and Truck product competition models, increasing the
number of products in the rst band by one standard deviation at the mean increases inventory
by 15% and 6%, respectively. This is similar to the marginal e¤ect obtained in the dealership
competition model estimated in Table 5 (12.5%), suggesting that they are capturing a similar
e¤ect: the impact of competition on service level.
Model (9) is estimated with OLS, which can produce biased estimates because Crb is endogenous.
The concern is that idiosyncratic consumer tastes for specic type of vehicles will a¤ect product line
decisions of dealers and their service levels at the same time, confounding the causal e¤ect of Crb.
Unfortunately, we do not have instruments to correct for the endogeneity of product line decisions.
Due to this, we believe that our estimation results using IV (reported in Table 5) are more robust
to a potential endogeneity bias. Nevertheless, the results from Table 8 provide further support on
the causal e¤ect of competition: it is hard to nd a confounder that biases the estimates of the
service level e¤ect in all the models we consider. In short, the estimated e¤ect of competition on
service level is robust to di¤erent specications and identication strategies.
To summarize, our empirical results can be interpreted as follows. First, the number of vehicles
o¤ered by rivals has a positive e¤ect on the service level of the products o¤ered by a dealership.
Second, most of the e¤ect of competition on service level is captured by products which are close
substitutes, i.e., a dealer does not respond to the entry of another dealer selling products in di¤erent
segments but the incumbent dealer does increase its service level in response to the entry of another
dealer who sells products in similar segments to the incumbent dealer. Third, there is a saturation
e¤ect: the rst close substitutes have a large impact on service level, but the e¤ect becomes smaller
as more products enter the rst band. Overall, these empirical results provide good support for our
conjecture that the intensity of inventory competition depends on the number and type of products
o¤ered in a market. This pattern is unlikely to be driven by unobserved market characteristics
a¤ecting service level.
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6. Economic signicance of local competition on dealership inven-
tory
There is concern in the U.S. automobile industry that the domestic manufacturers have too many
dealerships because (a) their dealership networks were established in the rst half of the century
when the country was less urbanized and (b) restrictive franchise laws impose signicant costs for
closing dealerships involuntarily (Rechtin and Wilson (2006)). Indeed, GM paid more than one
billion dollars to Oldsmobile dealers to close that brand, see Welch (2006)) Thus, it is of interest
to evaluate the potential impact of reducing the number of dealerships. This should have two
e¤ects on the remaining dealerships: (1) their sales will increase (they will capture some of the
sales from the closed dealership) and (2) they will reduce their service level (because they face less
competition). According to our estimates, both e¤ects reduce days-of-supply (inventory relative to
sales) which reduces inventory costs: inventory that turns over more quickly is less costly to hold.
In this section, we evaluate the relative magnitude of these two e¤ects.
We used the estimates of Table 5, column 4, to measure the e¤ect of closing some of GMs
dealerships.33 As in our estimation, we selected markets with eight or fewer dealerships. Among
these markets there are three or fewer GM dealerships. To evaluate the impact of reducing the
number of dealerships, we assumed in each market all GM dealerships are closed except the one
with the highest sales. If the dealership has multiple brands, then all of the brands are closed.
Furthermore, we assume all other dealerships remain (and none are added). The change in the
remaining GM dealers inventory depends on the number of sales it captures from the closed GM
dealerships. Assuming all sales from the closed dealerships are lost provides a lower bound whereas
assuming all of those sales are captured by the remaining dealer provides an upper bound of the
sales e¤ect. Thus, the lower bound provides the inventory reduction due only to the service level
e¤ect and the upper bound combines the service level e¤ect with the maximum sales e¤ect. Table
9 summarizes the results, where we report days-of-supply because we are interested in the potential
change in inventory costs.
We nd that the remaining dealers days-of-supply would decrease by 21 to 39 days: the 21
day reduction represents the service-level e¤ect and the di¤erence, 18 days, represents the sales
e¤ect. Hence, we nd that the service level e¤ect is of comparable magnitude to the sales e¤ect.
These results indicate that GM would carry less inventory (as measured by days-of-supply) if it
33The OLS estimates are more precise than the IV estimates and yield a more conservative reduction.
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were to close dealerships in our sample of its network. We emphasize that these results pertain to
our sample because, in part, of the non-linear relationship between the number of dealerships and
the service level e¤ect. For example, closing one of two GM dealership in a market with 6 other
(non-GM) dealerships has a di¤erent e¤ect than closing one of two GM dealership in a market with
only 1 other (non-GM) dealership. Therefore, even if our parameter estimates apply to all GM
markets, the magnitude of these e¤ects depend on the particular composition of each market. It
follows that is safest to interpret these results exclusively for the isolated markets we consider.
It is also important to be aware that we have not attempted to make an economic justication
for closing dealerships. Our results suggest that doing so will have a substantial impact on the
inventory carried by the remaining dealerships, but we have not quantied the sales impact, nor
can we compare the inventory holding cost savings with the potential prot impact of changing
sales.
7. Conclusion
We develop an econometric model to estimate the e¤ect of competition on inventory holdings. We
identify two drivers of inventory holdings: a sales e¤ect and a service level e¤ect. We nd that
the sales e¤ect reects strong economies of scale in managing inventory - increasing a dealers sales
reduces the dealers inventory when measured in terms of days-of-supply.
We are particularly interested in the impact of local competition on service levels (bu¤er inven-
tory held by dealerships conditional on sales). Theory is ambiguous on this point - some models
predict increased competition increases inventory, others predict a neutral relationship and yet
others predict that increased competition decreases inventory. In the context of the dealerships
in the automobile industry, we nd that competition increases service levels. If we consider ser-
vice level more generally as a form of service quality, this result is similar to the ndings of Berry
and Waldfogel (2001)(competition increases quality provided by restaurants) and Mazzeo (2003)
(competition in airline routes reduces ight delays).
While we nd that competition increases inventory in the auto industry, we also nd that the
marginal e¤ect of competition is decreasing: the rst entrant into a market with one established
dealer causes a 14% increase in inventory whereas entry beyond the seventh dealership has no
positive e¤ect on inventory (conditional on sales). We provide additional empirical evidence
showing that the service level of products depends on the number of close substitutes o¤ered by
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rivals, but is insensitive to the number of dissimilar products.
Our ndings suggest that inventory may vary across automobile brands in part because auto
brands vary in their dealership structures. As the dealership network becomes more dense there
are two reinforcing e¤ects on inventory. One, if sales per dealership declines as the number of
dealerships increases (which is plausible), then the presence of economies of scales with respect
to sales suggests that inventory, measured in days-of-supply, will increase. Second, an increase
in the density of dealerships increases competition (i.e., more dealerships per market), which also
increases inventory via higher service levels. Thus, when comparing two automobile distribution
networks, we expect (all else being equal) the one with the greater number of dealerships to carry
more inventory.
It is of interest to conrm whether our results hold for dealerships in urban markets, for other
automobile manufacturers, and in other retail industries. For example, in other retail industries it
could be possible that additional competition reduces margins signicantly, and such margin e¤ect
could dominate any demand retention or attraction e¤ects. In those cases, in contrast to our
results, increased competition would lead to lower service levels. Finally, given the recent turmoil
in the automobile industry, it is important to conrm that the dynamics in this industry have not
changed, at least with respect to competition and services levels.
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8. Appendix
8.1 Properties of K (z) function
Let D be a normally distributed random variable with mean  and standard deviation : Dene
Q =  + z and S = min fQ;Dg : Dene Y  Q  D and V () as the variance operator. Using a
result for the normal distribution truncated at zero (see ncite{olsen1980}):
V (DjD < Q) = V (Y jY > 0)
= 2 f1 +  (z) [ z    (z)]g (10)
where  (z) =  (z) = (z) is the hazard rate. The variance of sales V (S) can be expressed as
V (S) = V (SjD  Q) Pr (D  Q) + V (SjD < Q) Pr (D < Q)
= 2 f (z)   (z) [z +  (z)]g (11)
where 2 = V (D) and (11) follows from (10).
Begin with (1) and substitute the loss function for the standard normal, L (z) =  (z)  
z (1   (z)) ; and  derived from (11) to yield
I = sK (z) ;
where s = V (S)
1=2 and
K (z) = (z (z) +  (z)) f (z)   (z) [z +  (z)]g 1=2 :
Next, we wish to show that K(z) is increasing in z: Denote f1 = (z (z) +  (z)) and f2 (z) =
 (z)    (z) [z +  (z)] : Note that f 01 = (z) and that f2 (z)  0 (otherwise, V (S) could be
negative). It follows that
sign

K 0 (z)
	
= sign

 (z)  f2 (z)  1
2
f 02 (z) f1 (z)

= sign

f2 (z)  1
2
 (z) (z +  (z))3

= sign

 (z)   (z) [z +  (z)] 

1  1
2
(z +  (z))2

which is positive given that f2 (z)  0:
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8.2 GMM Estimation
Our estimation can be viewed as a special case of multiple equation GMM (see Hayashi (2000),
Chapter 4 for a general treatment of multiple equation GMM). We redene our notation to t our
model into this framework. Dene 1i = i, 2i = "i, y1i = _yi, y2i = yi and the column vectors
U1i =

_Xi;~0k

, U2i =
 
Xi;Wm(i)

, where ~0k is a column vector of zeros of dimension k :We
estimate the following moment conditions:
E (Z1i1i) = 0 (12)
E (Z2i2i) = 0 (13)
where Z1i and Z2i are vectors of exogenous instruments. Z2i includes measures of current and past
market population (described in section 3.3) and all demographics included in Wm(i): Z1i includes
_Xi and all the covariates included in Z2i: Let kp = dim (Zpi) for p = 1; 2, k = dim () and
k = dim () be the dimensions of the exogenous instruments and the vector parameters  and .
The error terms are given by:
1i () = y1i   U1i
2i () = y2i   U2i
Dene the stacked column vector
gi () =

Z1i1i ()
Z2i2i ()

The sample counterpart of the moment conditions (12) and (13) is given by g () = 1n
Pn
i=1 gi (),
where n is the number of observations.
If k1 + k2 = k + k the model is said to be just identied; in this case,  can be chosen to
make g () = ~0: If k1 + k2 < k + k , the model is not identied: there are innite values of  that
yield g () = ~0: If k1 + k2 > k + k ; which is our case, the model is said to be over-identied and
 is chosen to solve the quadratic form
^ (H) = argmin

g ()0Hg () (14)
whereH is any square positive-denite matrix of dimension k1+k2. H is referred to as the weighting
matrix, and  (H) is consistent for any choice of H: Because g () is linear in , (14) can be solved
analytically:
^ (H) =
 
S0zuHSz
 1
SzuHszy (15)
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where
szy =
 Pn
i=1 Z1iy1iPn
i=1 Z2iy2i

; and Szu =
 Pn
i=1 Z1iU
0
1iPn
i=1 Z2iU
0
2i

:
There is a choice of H that makes  (H) e¢ cient (it minimizes its asymptotic standard error).
Standard results of GMM show that e¢ ciency is maximized by choosing H as the inverse of S =
E [gig
0
i]. The computation of this e¢ cient weighting matrix requires approximating the expectation
E [g0igi] whose sample counterpart depends on : Hence, one needs to know  before computing an
estimate of S: GMM operates in two steps: in the rst step, one can use any weighting matrix
H to obtain a consistent estimate of ; in the second step, we use the estimated ^ to compute a
consistent estimate of S;
S^ =
1
n
nX
i=1
gi

^
0
gi

^

and then re-estimate  by solving (14) using H = S^ 1: In our case, we use the consistent estimate
of  provided by the two-step method described in section 2 to estimate S^: Denoting 0 the true
parameter and  the e¢ cient GMM estimator, the asymptotic variance is given by:
Avar () = V ar
 p
n (   0)

=

S0zuS^
 1Szu
 1
The estimator  has a multivariate normal distribution with mean 0 and covariance matrix
n 1Avar () :
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Buick Cadillac Chevrolet GMC Pontiac Saturn All
Number of dealers 134 109 170 101 134 6 654
Average inventory per dealer 12 12 44 17 16 93 23
Mean days-of-supply 151 151 133 130 197 118 152
Std. deviation of days-of-supply 80 83 43 59 91 32 76
Table 1: Inventory holdings of General Motor brand dealerships in our data sample (from 8/15/06 to 
2/15/07)
 
 
Population in UA 
(thousands)
P > 10 P  > 25 P  > 50 P  > 100
[0, 25] 30 30 50 50
[25,50] -- 30 50 50
[50,100] -- -- 30 50
[100,150] -- -- -- 50
Minimum distance (in miles) to a UA with the following 
populations, P
Table 2: Market selection criteria. A UA with population indicated in column 
1 is chosen if it meets the criteria in columns 2-5
 
 
 
# of 
dealers
# of 
markets
Median 
population
non-GM 
domestic Japanese 2nd GM
1 10 3.4 0% 0% 0%
2 24 6.2 88% 8% 4%
3 41 9.8 100% 5% 2%
4 27 14.3 100% 48% 41%
5 24 20.8 100% 83% 50%
6 21 38.2 100% 100% 43%
7 15 38.3 100% 100% 67%
8 20 57.4 100% 100% 95%
9 11 74.1 100% 100% 100%
10 12 68.2 100% 100% 100%
11 10 75.4 100% 100% 100%
12 3 100.3 100% 100% 100%
13 6 122.0 100% 100% 100%
14 1 105.4 100% 100% 100%
15 1 123.0 100% 100% 100%
% of markets with dealers
Table 3 – Market composition. The last three columns show the percent of 
markets with at least one dealership of non-GM domestic manufacturers, 
Japanese manufacturers and a second GM dealership, respectively.
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Summary statistics and correlation matrix.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) logINV 2.62 1.01 0.13 5.06 1.00
(2) logSALES 2.92 1.05 0.00 5.75 0.91 1.00
(3) ND 4.68 2.07 1.00 8.00 0.47 0.45 1.00
(4) NGM 1.50 0.63 1.00 3.00 0.38 0.37 0.68 1.00
(5) OUTSIDE 0.94 0.56 0.02 3.42 -0.14 -0.16 -0.15 -0.18 1.00
(6) NBRAND 3.41 1.25 1.00 5.00 -0.30 -0.31 -0.34 -0.51 0.15 1.00
(7) TRANSF 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.57 -0.14 -0.01 -0.09 -0.05 -0.02 0.05
Correlations
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1 Joint
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS IV OLS GMM
logSALES 0.640** 0.675**
(0.027) (0.022)
NBRAND 0.035 -0.011
(0.023) (0.020)
TRANSF -0.790** -0.82**
(0.228) (0.156)
ND 0.159** 0.333* 0.161** 0.387**
(0.038) (0.133) (0.038) (0.100)
NDSQ -0.009* -0.023 -0.012** -0.031**
(0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.011)
NGM 0.133**
(0.035)
OUTSIDE -0.070* -0.036 -0.070* -0.028
(0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.024)
Observations 654 649 649 649 649
R-squared 0.84 0.26 0.22 0.27 n/a
Step 2
Table 5 – Main estimation results. Dependent variable is logINV.  Demographic variables and dummies 
for brand, region and ALLSTATE are not shown. Column (1) shows the results from the 1st step of the 
two step method; columns (2)-(4) shows the estimates from the 2nd step. Column (3) uses IVs to 
instrument for ND  and NDSQ . Column (5) shows the joint estimation using GMM. Standard errors 
shown in parenthesis. ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5%. Robust standard errors are 
reported for column (1).
 
 
 
(1) (2)
INIM 0.083** 0.006
-0.031 -0.03
logPOP -0.058**
-0.004
Constant 5.008** 5.658**
-0.05 -0.073
Observations 2411 2411
R-squared 0.25 0.31
Table 6: Days-of-supply for all dealer-brand pairs in isolated 
(INIM  = 1) and non-isolated (INIM  = 0) markets in seven 
states (CA,CO,FL,ME,NE,TX,WI)
 
 
 
Make
Our data from 
ALLSTATE states Ward's data
Necessary fleet sales to 
add to our sales to match 
DS (as a % of total sales)
Buick 122 97 21%
Cadillac 79 81 -2%
Chevrolet(*) 104 81 22%
Pontiac-GMC(*) 134 92 25%
Saturn 93 94 -1%
 (*) excludes Medium‐duty pickups.
Days-of-supply
Table 7: Days-of-supply evaluated from our data compared to data reported by 
Ward's Automotive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LOGSALES 0.5711** 0.5706** 0.7957** 0.7955**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.0241) (0.0241)
TRANSF -0.4064* -0.4273* -0.3631 -0.4030*
(0.2037) (0.2038) (0.1886) (0.1894)
N B(PRICE,SIZE) 0.0118* 0.0332** 0.0069 0.0304
(0.0057) (0.0118) (0.006) (0.019)
NSQ B(PRICE,SIZE) -0.0004* -0.0006
(0.0002) (0.0004)
N B(STD_CAR) -0.0125 -0.0182
(0.0073) (0.0154)
NSQ B(STD_CAR) 0.0000
(0.0002)
N B(ANY_CAR) -0.0143 -0.0148
(0.0079) (0.0129)
N B(TRUCK) -0.0066 -0.0049
(0.0042) (0.0092)
NSQ B(TRUCK) 0.0000
(0.0001)
N B(OTHER) 0.0004 -0.0012 0.0030 0.0030
(0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0048) (0.0049)
Observations 775 775 712 712
R-squared 0.6 0.6 0.69 0.69
SM car Light Trucks
Table 8 - Estimation results with the number of models as a measure of competition 
(equation (9)). Separate regressions were estimated for small- medium size cars 
(SM cars) and light trucks. N B(.) measures the number of models on each product 
band, and NSQ B(.) its square. All specifications include dummies for region, price 
and ALLSTATE, and demographic controls.
 
 
 
 
Lower bound Upper bound 
1 115 144 21.9 38.4
2 20 129 30.0 54.4
Total 142 140 21.8 39.4
Table 9 – Comparison of sales and service level effects. The lower bound indicates the reduction 
in days-of-supply due to the service level effect of closing dealerships in the markets in our study; 
the upper bound is the reduction due to the service level and sales effects combined.
# dealers of closed No. of obs. Actual days-of-supply
Reduction in days-of-supply
 
 
 
Figure 1: Location of dealerships in our sample 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Effect of competition on the targeted service level, measured as the change in 
inventory relative to a monopolist GM dealership. The curve shows the estimated effect 
using specification (2). + and – indicate upper and lower bounds on the 95% confidence 
interval, respectively, for these estimates. Squares show the estimated effect using a 
flexible non-parametric function. 
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